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It is commonly the case that sound, epistemological principles such as ba-
sic beliefs immediately become regarded as invalid when applied to theistic
contexts. I will show that despite this, there is a strong sense of compara-
bility between beliefs in God with beliefs in non-theistic beings and other
commonly-held basic beliefs such as qualities of love and trust. To establish
that both the belief in the existence of God and the existence of other be-
ings and non-perceptual qualities are justified as evidence in the same way, I
will have to establish that they are both what Plantinga calls properly basic
beliefs. I will argue that this comparability makes it equally justifiable for
the belief in God’s existence in itself to be basic, in the same way that it
is with other commonly-held beliefs. This argument does however require
strong grounds to prove its viability, so I will be examining and critiquing
the arguments which allude to a contradiction of this conclusion. By care-
fully examining these arguments, I will ultimately attempt to provide further
justification for Plantinga’s claim that the mere belief in God is sufficient to
be regarded as evident to the self, without needing to be justified through
logical arguments.
2 Plantinga’s argument
Plantinga maintains that the belief in the existence of God is basic, ax-
iomatic, and defeasible, and therefore does not require logical argument in
order to justify this belief as true. He writes, “to believe or assert that
God exists is to believe that there exists a being of a certain very special
sort” [1]. This sort, according to Plantinga, is comparable to the belief in
a sort of corporeal person who holds beliefs and has purposes, goodness,
knowledge and power. Similarly, Herman Bavinck points out that belief in
God resembles belief in the existence of other minds, and the self, in the
sense that we do not need arguments to believe that other minds do in fact
exist, as we can know how to identify rational beings by being a rational
being ourselves [2]. Plantinga’s ideas stem from reformer John Calvin who
believed that God can be recognised in the same way as a person can, as a
result of the “innate disposition” that God has planted in us, the “sensus
divinitatis” [3] (the divine sense which leads us to an immediate belief in
God, rather than one reached by argument). This works in the same way
as sense perception and is a part of the natural noetic structure of man,
constituting as empirical evidence. This is what Calvin believes to have
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caused in people a natural, strong tendency to believe in God in the same
way that we believe in physical beings and sensory qualities that are clear
to our senses and imagination. I will begin to analyse exactly what makes
Calvin and therefore Plantinga justified in forming this comparison.
3 What makes belief in God properly basic?
Both the belief in the existence of God and the existence of other beings
and non-perceptual qualities are linked by the sufficiency of the belief as
being evident to the self. Evidence is a body of facts which indicate the
truthfulness and validity of a belief or proposition. It is difficult to say
what counts as actual evidence, since there are no absolute criteria for how
evidence should be constituted. Many attempts have been made to con-
jure a criterion for what counts as evidence, including those from classical
foundationalists and evidentialists. Rather, a decision for what constitutes
as evidence is often made based on subjective judgments, and much of the
decision-making process relies on accounts of personal experiences and per-
ception. As with other beliefs, we can say that the belief in God indeed
requires evidence in order for it to be verified as a true belief. However,
it can be shown that like many beliefs, evidence for the belief in God is
grounded in non-inferential reasoning. There is, of course, the need to de-
fend one’s belief in God from its critics in order that it is a properly basic
belief. It is not enough for one to think that a belief is properly basic, as
this is not rational. In all definitions of proper basicality, the belief must
actually be properly basic. By this, I mean that there must be rational,
strong grounds through which the belief is formed. Plantinga nevertheless
holds that when people say they hold a belief in God, they are referring to
belief in the many conditions that call forth this belief in God, comprised ac-
cording to Plantinga of “guilt, gratitude, danger, a sense of God’s presence,
a sense that he speaks and perception of various parts of the universe” [4].
There must also be certain perceptual conditions in place in order for one
to have strong and rational grounds for their beliefs, such as having reli-
able belief-forming mechanisms (i.e. knowing that one is not in a dreaming
state, and knowing that one is mentally capable of forming a rational belief).
By establishing a solid criterion for proper basicality, we can come to
know how to justify evidence, and therefore determine which beliefs are per-
missible in being classed as basic beliefs.
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A classical foundationalist proposes the following universal criterion for
proper basicality:
(1) For any proposition A and person S, A is properly basic for S if and
only if A is incorrigible for S or self-evident to S. [5]
According to the classical foundationalist, there is a presupposition that
there must be definite rules to deciding which beliefs should be properly
basic. Put into practice, we can see how flawed this criterion is. For ex-
ample, a person who claims they felt nauseous in the morning would not
be justified in believing this, as there is insufficient evidence to prove that
they experienced this sensation. This seems absurd to say that one cannot
be justified in experiencing what they thought they felt, particularly as the
person is likely to be entirely convinced that they did indeed experience the
sensation of nausea, accompanied by strong evidence that that their mind
is in a stable state and not playing tricks on them.
The classical foundationalist’s rules for proper basicality are simply not
feasible. As with the example of the nauseous sensation, certain memory
beliefs, perceptual beliefs and beliefs that ascribe mental states are all ex-
amples of beliefs which do not fit this criterion as not all are directly evident
to the senses, yet they are still universally believed. Thus, basic beliefs do
not require a strict criterion, they can be regarded as evidence in themselves
without being backed up by empirical proof that is evident to the senses,
insofar as they are believed on strong and rational grounds. To illustrate
this, Plantinga gives examples of three beliefs which are commonly-held,
and evident to the self without the requirement of argument to prove their
truthfulness [6].
1. I see a tree
2. I had breakfast this morning
3. That person is angry
Since many simple, commonly-held beliefs follow the same structure as
these paradigms that Plantinga provides, the classical foundationalist’s cri-
teria for basic beliefs becomes nonsensical, as such simple beliefs would not
be classed as properly basic although they can indeed be applied universally.
4
4 The Great Pumpkin Objection
Plantinga thinks that the belief in God’s existence must have strong, cir-
cumstantial grounds which would qualify in making these beliefs justified
in being properly basic. He uses the Great Pumpkin objection as a way of
demonstrating the feasibility of beliefs in God as basic compared to proposi-
tions which have no grounds for properly basic belief. For example, it would
not be reasonable to take the proposition that “the Great Pumpkin returns
every year for Halloween” [7] as a properly basic belief. This is because there
are no strong circumstantial grounds in which this belief can be justified, as
there are no circumstances in which the great pumpkin is likely to appear
since its existence has never been accounted for. We can play around with
this example and say that person A has just as much evidence to believe
that the Great Pumpkin will return every year for Halloween (x) as a per-
son who believes in the existence of God, as both people have no perceptual
evidence for their existences. However, if we take what constitutes as evi-
dence according to the reformed epistemologist, we can say that there are
no circumstances in which this belief in the Great Pumpkin could be classed
as proper, and so it is an irrational and groundless claim. This makes rea-
sonable sense when applied to real life situations. For example, the belief
that “I see a bush” is properly basic in circumstances where I am outside in
a park and sitting on a bench. However, the same belief is not likely to be
true and would not be properly basic if I were sitting on my couch in a dark
room with my eyes closed. It is therefore simple non-inferential beliefs such
as “I see a bush” which are reasonable, as such propositions are informed
by good judgement and strong grounds for belief.
In the same way, similar non-theistic and non-inferential paradigms like
these are comparable to assigning the observation of the universe to the cre-
ation of the world, thus providing grounds for justification of the belief in
God’s existence. Plantinga’s argument for whether self-evidence is sufficient
for basic belief in God, relies on the analogousness between the paradigmatic
basic beliefs and the basic belief that God exists. To provide strong proof
of the analogousness between these two categories of basic beliefs (theistic
and non-theistic), I will disprove three disanalogies Richard Grigg has in re-
sponse to Plantinga, between paradigmatic basic beliefs (1) (2) and (3), and
the belief in God. In forming these disanalogies, Grigg aims for Plantinga
to reconsider his reasoning to beliefs in God being properly basic.
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5 Grigg’s disanalogies
The first claim of disanalogy between the paradigmatic basic beliefs and
theistic beliefs which Grigg makes is that the theistic belief-formation is in-
fluenced by bias, whilst (1), (2) and (3) are not [8]. He thinks that with
theistic beliefs, there is a will for the belief in question to be true, whereas
with non-theistic basic beliefs like the paradigms, the belief is not influenced
by a will for it to be true. Firstly, with all beliefs there is a sense of willing-
ness or hope that the belief that is held is true, but because of the basicality
of the belief, the belief itself is not affected by this willingness. Grigg seems
to make a fundamental mistake in assuming that the desire to believe in
the existence of God necessarily makes the belief biased, implying that the
belief is disingenuous. As with any belief, it is quite reasonable for there to
be a hope or will for the belief in question to be based on truth, without it
being a factor of bias. This means that it is possible that our willingness
for the truthfulness of the belief in question, is ordinarily engrained into our
beliefs, happening as an automatic result of the beliefs forming. Even if the
desire to believe was involved in the belief-forming mechanism, this does not
necessarily make it biased. Bias would only have an impact on the belief or
belief-forming mechanism if it were to be influenced by another factor, e.g.
an incentive to persuade. Wanting a belief to be true in itself is not valid
reasoning for Grigg to say a belief is biased, as it is not necessarily the case
that wanting something to be true in itself leads to a heavy influence on the
way the belief is formed, as Grigg assumes it does. It seems logical enough
for desire to ordinarily play a role within the belief itself, which would make
it no different from the role of desire within the paradigmatic beliefs. The
theistic believer may subconsciously hold a desire for their theistic beliefs to
be heard and understood by others, yet this is not an indication of a bias
either as it is ordinary to hold this desire with any belief and does not influ-
ence the belief itself. If an alien being came to Earth and was unaware that
the object in front of them was a tree, one would feel the desire to convince
them otherwise, but they would not use this desire to form their belief that
the object in question is a tree. Similarly, if a believer in God were to be
confronted with somebody who was not aware of the nature of God, the
believer would feel a desire to inform the person of the nature of God, yet
this desire is separate from the belief itself. Once a belief is formed, one
may want to maintain their belief, but beliefs tend to be based on a form of
subjective rationality which makes the information believable enough to the
person without the separate desire for it to be true to have any real effect
on the belief. Desire seems to be a separate element altogether. For exam-
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ple, by holding the belief ‘there is a tree’, one may primarily truly believe
that there is in fact a tree, yet they may subconsciously hold the desire,
not for their belief to be true, but for their belief-forming mechanisms to be
in working order so that the belief is indeed justified. Thus, it seems that
willingness in theistic beliefs plays the same role as in paradigmatic beliefs,
in that it is an ordinary element in any belief, and that the desire is separate
from the belief itself, proving Grigg’s disanalogy to hold little weight.
The second claim of a disanalogy that Grigg makes is the element of
universality to paradigm beliefs, as opposed to theistic beliefs which there
is no universality. By this, he means that if one were to stand in a park
and observe a tree-like figure, they would deduce that “there is a tree”. One
would be automatically disposed to believe it on the basis that it is a per-
ceptual experience that they immediately deem as correct, yet if one were
to say that “there is a starry night, God must have created it”, it would
not be a universal belief that this were true. An agnostic may look at the
sky and deduce that it is there by chance, the initial perceptual experience
does not always lead to the belief that there is a God. Grigg thinks that if
it were correct for God to be a basic belief, this universality would have to
be analogous with the universality of the paradigmatic beliefs, so therefore
it cannot be a basic belief. I do not believe that this successfully proves
his point that this is a disanalogy. As McLeod points out, there are two-
levels of a belief; the ‘first-level belief’ in which immediately forms a belief
on the basis of perceptual experience x, and ‘second-level belief’ in which a
belief is formed from a set of other beliefs which are unique to a person or
thing [9]. Grigg seems to be wrong in saying that the paradigmatic beliefs
are all first-level beliefs. While paradigm (1) is clearly a first-level belief,
paradigms (2) and (3) are second-level beliefs. This is because two different
individuals can deduce completely different beliefs on the basis of the same
belief. For paradigm (3): “that person is angry”, the universal ‘first-level’
basic belief may be that ‘there exists a living person who can feel emotions’,
in which both parties would agree on. But from this belief, one may de-
duce that ‘this person is concentrating very hard on their work at hand’
whilst the other deduces that ‘this person is angry’. What branches off of
the first-level beliefs are subjective and dependent on interpretation. This
could be because person (b) is mistaken and has not examined the person
enough, hence forming a premature conclusion about the emotional state of
the person in question. My theory is that theistic beliefs work in the same
way as the paradigmatics (2) and (3), as perhaps one who is more informed
would deduce from the first-level belief ‘it is a starry night’ that ‘God cre-
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ated the stars, and therefore God exists’, whilst an agnostic might deduce
that it exists by chance, whilst another might deduce that it was created
by aliens. Thus, the belief in God’s existence can be tested by induction,
which justifies it as properly basic. Just as all people belonging to the same
religious group will have different ideas based on the same theistic beliefs,
as it is with regular basic beliefs. Therefore, the paradigmatic beliefs can be
paralleled to theistic beliefs in God.
The final disanalogy Grigg has is in my opinion his strongest claim. He
says it is possible to either confirm or deny with outside sources whether a
memory is true, whilst this is not possible with theistic beliefs. Empirically,
this is true, one can indeed confirm they had breakfast by looking at their
empty cereal bowl in the sink, or one can rely on their own past experiences
of seeing a tree to confirm whether what they are now seeing is in fact a
tree. He goes on to say that if one’s memory were to gradually become more
unreliable in their old age, it is still possible to a certain degree to recognise
this deficiency, so one cannot claim that it is because of their failing mem-
ory that they cannot recognise whether their memory is actually reliable.
Whereas, with theistic beliefs there are no outside sources to confirm the
reliability of their memories, e.g. if God spoke to them in a dream. How-
ever, this does not prove to be a disanalogy if we are to follow Plantinga’s
claim that different types of evidence can be classed as empirical, and can
be proved as empirical if a belief is evident to the self. This type of evi-
dence does not need confirmation through outside sources, but is sufficient
for one to have a basic belief on the basis of their own personal experience.
I am claiming that Grigg’s disanalogy is weak because in many cases, one
cannot know for sure whether the evidence their experience is based on is in
fact empirical knowledge because there is usually always a chance that one
can be mistaken in both cases of paradigmatic and theistic beliefs. Using
Grigg’s example of recalling whether one had breakfast in the morning, it is
the case that one cannot be completely sure that they had eaten breakfast
strictly on the basis of the cereal bowl being in the sink. One may think that
they know the cereal bowl belonged to them, causing them to form a belief
that they did indeed have breakfast, but circumstances such as being in a
rush may have caused them to mistake their bowl for another person’s bowl.
Even if they strongly believed the bowl belonged to them and if they did
not doubt the reliability of their memory, they could still be wrong. Thus,
one could falsely believe something based on what they believe of their own
experience, falsely qualifying it as empirical evidence. Similarly, they could
be completely correct in their recollection of whether they had eaten break-
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fast that morning, as it is a matter of chance whether one can remember the
correct information. This is the same with theistic beliefs, in that an expe-
rience may be recalled wrongly, and there is unreliability through outside
sources. They may have had a dream where God appears and tells them to
leave Peru, but through false recollection, they may recall that God had told
them to stay in Peru, leading them to a false belief which they classify as
empirical. This is an example of one finding empirical evidence through the
self, which to some degree both paradigmatic and theistic beliefs do. This
means that there is no flawless verification method for the complete relia-
bility of our belief-forming practices like memory, or with outside sources.
There is therefore no disanalogy between the paradigmatic basic beliefs and
the belief of God’s existence.
6 Are properly basic beliefs immoral?
William Clifford holds the evidentialist theory that it is “morally wrong” to
accept any beliefs that are not based on ‘sufficient evidence. He thinks that
these beliefs act “in defiance of our duty to mankind” [10]. His thinking is
that beliefs such as these can dangerously compromise the welfare of other
people, or influence people in a way that can be harmful. The problem with
this is that it is largely presumptuous and mostly inaccurate, as he has not
considered many beliefs which do not morally compromise the lives of oth-
ers, but act independently of this sense of influence on others. In his essay
The Ethics of Belief, he gives the example of the shipowner sending out an
emigrant ship to sea, despite having the knowledge that the foundations of
the ship were weak and damaged. Although he was aware that the state of
the ship could compromise several lives when sent out to sea, the shipowner
convinced himself to believe that the ship was safe to send out to sea. In this
case, Clifford thinks that the shipowner had no right to believe based on the
evidence he had, and so he must be held responsible for the consequences
as he stifled his doubts about the unsafe nature of the ship before sending
it out [11]. Similarly, Clifford thinks that one who holds a belief in God,
believes without sufficient evidence, for example one cannot say that there
is in fact solid evidence provided by arguments such as the cosmological or
ontological arguments. Thus, he argues that in putting his passions of belief
before his moral responsibility to others, one he defies his duty to mankind
in the same way that the shipowner had done.
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This argument is flawed in two ways, and can easily be shown to be
unreasonable. Firstly, it is unreasonable because Clifford makes the funda-
mental mistake of attacking the argument by beginning with the assumption
that God does not exist, which would make the argument too easy. Flew
puts it like this; “the affirmative cannot properly appeal, in its arguments,
to such premises as that there is such a person as God” [12]. In the same
way, one cannot appeal to the presumption of atheism, that is, that there is
no such a person as God.
Secondly, Clifford provides a weak demonstration of his argument. He
chooses an extreme example of when a person chooses to perform an im-
moral action through a belief that deliberately disregards important facts.
Though he points out that the shipowner forces himself to believe that the
ship is fine, he still carries vital information which cannot simply be disre-
garded; the faultiness of the ship and its potential to harm people on board.
This underlying knowledge of potential harm makes the example a special
case, one which differs from other cases of holding basic beliefs which have
the consequence of harming others. To show this, we can take the example
of the doctor. A well-informed, experienced doctor could issue the wrong
prescription to a patient who has a rare condition which there has been little
research of, and which there have been only four others to have inherited the
condition, slowly causing the patient to be killed by the prescription over
time. It would not be fair to say that the incorrect basis by which this belief
was formed, was immoral, as there was a desire for the patient to be cured as
well as what was thought of as good judgement of which prescription should
have been issued. Though having a harmful end, there was no immorality in
holding this mistaken belief that the prescription would cure the patient, as
it is the job of the doctor to make informed judgements, and the doctor was
fulfilling his duty in issuing the prescription. This is a more viable example
of how a basic belief can result in having harmful consequences. However, it
is easy to confuse this for ones holding of a belief immorally, which Clifford
appears to do in the example of the shipowner. It is only a matter of luck
that a basic belief has unfortunate ends, and it is rarely the case that the
belief itself is immoral as it was in the example of the shipowner, as basic
beliefs do not specify a particular moral code.
Clifford has disregarded an important point, that basic beliefs are in-
corporated into situations that are not immoral every day. In his lecture
The Will to Believe, James provides practical examples of how we already
naturally apply faith and belief in others in every-day social situations, and
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how this is justification for us to apply the same logic to theistic situations.
7 Self-fulfilling beliefs
William James thinks that much of society and political bodies rely on hav-
ing faith in the personal actions of others. This is what he calls “self-fulfilling
beliefs” [13], which he says in themselves are evidence which is enough to
justify the belief. These self-fulfilling beliefs originate through adopting so-
cial expectations and faith in others. He states that “wherever a desired
result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its ex-
istence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another
of those immediately concerned” [14]. In order that one unified body can
form, there is a reliance on the cooperation of collective individuals to work
together in forming this body. For this, there must be a preliminary sense
of trust and expectation in order to form the desired result of unification in
a ‘body of individuals such as the army or the government. This can also
be applied to many different social situations in every day contexts. James
provides the example of the passengers on the train:
“A whole train of passengers (individually brave enough) will be looted
by a few highwaymen, simply because the latter can count on one another,
while each passenger fears that if he makes a movement of resistance, he
will be shot before anyone else backs him up. If we believed that the whole
car-full would rise at once with us, we should each severally rise, and train
robbing would never even be attempted” [15]
This preliminary faith in the collective civilised manner of individuals
eventually becomes a social norm. In fact, because it becomes naturally im-
plemented into normal situations, it becomes irrational to believe that the
system works in any other way. As James points out, if the system were any
different from how it naturally is, e.g. ‘if we believed that the whole car-full
would rise at once’, then the outcome would be completely different. As this
would defy the norm, it is often quite unimaginable for the systematic reac-
tions to a train-robbing to be any other way than it already is. This shows
the preliminary bar of expectation is set by societal norms, which normalises
the commonality of our beliefs that the outcome will be the same each time,
such as our expectations of how a train-robbing would go. Hardly anybody
would expect a car-full of people to rise against the robbing, so the strong
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belief that there will be fear and passivity as a result of the robbing, would
be considered as properly basic, as it is a commonly-held belief that these
will be the reactions of people being robbed. Similarly, there are cases in
which a fact cannot come at all without this sense of preliminary faith, such
as one having faith that they are able to succeed in the field of triple jump.
Without this preliminary faith, the person would not believe in themselves
enough to enter into competitions, and they may stop practicing, it is only
with preliminary belief in oneself that one would complete all of the steps
which would lead them to establishing themselves as a successful athlete.
Thus, there are strong grounds to the belief that this predisposed trust
in others can be applied to having a predisposed faith and trust in the exis-
tence of God, which needs no logical argument in the same way that trust
in others needs no argument to justify it. The preliminary trust and faith
is crucial in regular social situations, which Clifford tends to disregard. By
Cliffords logic, basic beliefs in others such as natural trust and faith, would
be regarded as irrational in any situation, as there is often no strong ev-
idence which suggests this trust should be applied, yet we can see that it
naturally happens in many situations such as the example on the bus which
James describes. If this belief can be rationally and naturally applied to
social situations, then there is nothing in the belief itself that morally com-
promises the welfare of others, since there are only high stakes when the
belief is accompanied by a disregard of another persons welfare. Similarly,
in examining Cliffords argument, we can see that there is a difference in the
moral conditions of forming a belief while disregarding known important
facts, and forming a belief based on obliviousness to the danger the conse-
quences of enacting this belief may have. It is merely a matter of coincidence
for harm to ensue as a result of a belief, which can happen with theistic and
non-theistic basic beliefs, yet the beliefs in themselves are both non-harmful.
When the basic beliefs are based on sound judgment in that they use reason
and self-evidence to make informed opinions, the consequences of a basic
belief have the equal potential to have a positive impact on others.
8 Conclusion
To conclude, we have seen the similarities between non-theistic paradigmatic
basic beliefs, and the belief in the existence of God. Through analysing
Grigg’s disanalogies we have seen that his claims cannot indefinitely prove
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the disanalogousness between the paradigmatic cases and theistic cases.
Plantinga’s arguments and paradigms provide a feasible guideline for how
we should analyse the ways in which we can show that beliefs based on
self-evidence are sufficient for evidence for the belief in God’s existence. We
have seen that the belief in God is held on the same basis as qualities such
as love, trust and expectation, as well as other basic beliefs casually held
and implemented in day-to-day social activity. Thus, it is reasonable for the
belief in God to be understood in the same way as non-theistic basic beliefs.
James’ ideas on self-fulfilling beliefs show that when considering basicality
with beliefs in God, we can adopt the same method of belief that human
emotions exist, because we do not doubt our trust or faith in other people
unless there is reason for this doubt. As a result, Plantinga’s ‘no criterion’
alternative to classical foundationalism is the most feasible form of justifi-
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